	•		27	June 1953	
			Cor	No. 67	
•					
·	CURRENT	INTELLIGEN	CE BULLETIN		
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		•			3.5(c)
	Office	of Current In	telligence		
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SUMMARY

GENERAL

Poland opens credit for 5,000 tons of Chilean copper (page 3).

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST

South Korean government extends emergency aid to released POW's (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Philippine UN representative sees possible danger in Korean truce (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3.3(h)(2)

Comment on sultan's status in Morocco (page o).

WESTERN EUROPE

Gruber gives account of his recent conference with Nehru (page 6).

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TOP SEC

GENERAL

		_ 3.3(h)(2)
		3.3(11)(2)
	guarantee system for preventing copper transshipments to the Orbit	
	has been inadequate, the Chilean government apparently has not sanctioned any direct shipments since 1950.	3.3(h)(2)
	An attempt to move 5,000 tons of copper in a single shipment to any destination other than the US would presumably arouse government suspicion regarding the ultimate end user. The quantity involved, however, is immediately available for export, and the decrease in Chile's sales of copper in the free world market	
	favors Orbit efforts to obtain copper.	
2		_ 3.3(h)(2)
2.		3.3(h)(2)
2.	- 3 -	3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 C02872223 SECURITY INFORMATION	3.5(
	3.3(h)(2
FAR EAST	3.3(h)(2)
South Korean government extends emergency aid to released POW's:	3.3(h)(2
the South Korean government has set up a detailed emergency aid pro- gram for the freed anti-Communist pris-	0.0(11)(2
oners.	3.3(h)(2
prisoners who were unable to locate friends or relatives would be assisted by an organization "which will administer an area for released prisoners."	3.3(h)(2
Comment: This information shows the determination of the government to protect and assist the released	
prisoners.	3.3(h)(2


3.5(c)

SOUTHEAST ASIA

ŀ.	Philippine UN representative sees possible danger in Korean truce:	3.3(N)(Z)				
		3.3(h)(2)				
	the UN position on the Korea truce does not satisfy Philippine national inte					
	ests, inasmuch as an armistice based on a divided Korea leaves the possibility of future Communist aggression. an armistice would have a "detrimental effect" on Philippine security if it led the United States to withdraw from areas of danger					
	in Asia.	·				
	Comment: There have been strong expressions of sympathy for President Rhee's stand by some elements of the Philippine press and by some opposition leaders.					
	In general, the Philippine government has supported the American position and has proposed its good offices in reaching a settlement with Rhee. Manila's attitude, however, may be modified out of fear that removal of US forces and a possible change	ge				

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

in the status of Formosa would endanger Philippine security.



TOP SECRET

6. Comment on sultan's status in Morocco:

Fear for his throne or his life, rather than the lack of a French government, allegedly was the reason for the sultan of Morocco's 20 June postponement of his visit to France.

Tetuan, the sultan's representative in Spanish Morocco, is tacitly supporting the campaign against the sultan led by El Glaoui, chieftain of the southern tribes. gains credibility from the khalifa's failure to make an expected statement supporting the sultan. The khalifa would be one of the leading contenders for the throne, if the sultan were deposed.

Eight of the principal pashas and many lesser officials in Morocco have come to the sultan's defense. While there is no important support for the sultan among the French in Morocco, in Paris some influential intellectuals and liberals are pressuring the government to oust Resident General Guillaume as the first step toward a conciliatory solution of the Moroccan situation.

Barring a fanatical attempt to assassinate or dethrone the sultan, the present tension may subside somewhat with the installation of the new French government. A generally calmer atmosphere is unlikely, however, until the French residents in Morocco abandon their present attitudes and tactics and a workable program of administrative reform is instituted.

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Gruber gives account of his recent conference with Nehru:

Foreign Minister Gruber has informed the American embassy in Vienna that he discussed the Austrian situation with Indian prime minister Nehru in Switzerland last week end in the nope that India would be willing to sound out Soviet intentions concerning an Austrian treaty. Gruber gained the impression that India would seek an opportunity to raise the question, but would not press the discussion unless Soviet representatives were willing.

TOP SECRET

3.3(h)(2)

Nehru was particularly interested in the Austrian neutrality issue, and Gruber stressed to him Austria's inability to accept any treaty provision concerning neutrality which would be likely to satisfy the USSR. Gruber pointed out that the most his government could agree to would be a provision for a "carefully-worded" declaration by the Austrian parliament against military alliances, and that the government could agree to this only if it were essential for Soviet consent to sign a treaty.

Comment: The Western powers have consistently opposed including any statement on Austrian neutrality in the state treaty.

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3.3(h)(2)

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